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AUTOMOBILES: VEHICLE KEPT FOR USE OF FAMILY:
THE "FAMILY PURPOSE" DOCTRINE-JUST WHAT IS
ITS PURPOSE IN NORTH DAKOTA?
Schobinger v. Ivey, 467 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1991).
On October 31, 1988, Tara Mathis was driving Jack Schob-
inger's car when she was involved in a collision with a vehicle
owned and driven by Roland Michael Ivey.' As a result of the col-
lision, Schobinger's car incurred extensive damage, while the dam-
age to Ivey's vehicle was negligible.2 Subsequently, Schobinger
brought suit against Ivey to recover for the damage to his car.3
The district court determined that Schobinger's stepdaughter,
Mathis, and Ivey were both fifty percent negligent and imputed
Mathis' negligence to Schobinger by applying the "family pur-
pose" doctrine.4 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's holding and held that the "family purpose" doc-
trine should be extended to impute the driver's negligence to the
owner of the family vehicle for the purpose of limiting the owner's
recovery for property damage against a third party tortfeasor.5
The "family purpose" doctrine 6 arose as a result of the advent
of the motorized automobile in the United States during the early
twentieth century.' The theory underlying the "family purpose"
1. Schobinger v. Ivey, 467 N.W.2d 728, 729 (N.D. 1991). Tara Mathis is the
stepdaughter of Jack Schobinger. Id. The accident occurred in Grand Forks, North
Dakota, on second avenue north near the University of North Dakota. Brief of Appellee at
1, Schobinger v. Ivey, 467 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1991) (No. 900315) (available at the University
of North Dakota Thormodsgard Law Library) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief]. Apparently,
an accumulation of moisture from the previous night had formed a thin sheet of ice on areas
of the road surface where the accident occurred. Id.
2. Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 729. The repair estimate for Schobinger's vehicle was
$1,351.93. Appellees' Brief at 1, Schobinger (No. 900315). Schobinger recouped $1,251.93
from his insurance company, Austin Mutual Insurance Company, and the remaining $100
was paid by Mathis. Id.
3. Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 729. At trial, Ivey moved to join Austin Mutual
Insurance Company and Tara Mathis as plaintiffs. Appellees' Brief at 2, Schobinger (No.
900315). In addition, Schobinger moved to amend his Complaint to reduce his damages by
$100. Id. The district court denied both of the motions. Id.
4. Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 729. Schobinger appealed the district court's holding to
the North Dakota Supreme Court. Id.
5. Id. at 730. The court employed a "both ways" test, which is discussed infra note 69.
6. The "family purpose" doctrine has also been referred to by different authorities as
the "family car" doctrine, the "family vehicle" doctrine, and the "family use" doctrine.
R.E. Barber, Annotation, Modern Status of Family Purpose Doctrine with Respect to Motor
Vehicles, 8 A.L.R.3d 1191, 1195 n.2 (1966 & Supp. 1990). For an early article discussing the
"family purpose" doctrine, see Edward W. Hope, The Doctrine of the Family Automobile, 8
A.B.A. J. 359 (1922).
7. Norman D. Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile, 26 MICH. L.
REV. 846 (1927-1928). The introduction and increasing use of the automobile in the early
twentieth century has caused changes in the general tort law for two primary reasons.
G.H.L. Fridman, The Doctrine of the "Family Car" A Study in Contrasts, 8 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 323 (1976) (comparing the doctrine in the United States, Canada, and England). On
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doctrine is that the head of the family furthers his or her business
by furnishing a vehicle for the family's pleasure.' Accordingly,
when a family member uses the vehicle for pleasure, the family
member is carrying out the "business" of the owner, thereby
becoming the owner's fictional agent or servant.9 On the basis of
this fictional agency relationship, the non-negligent owner is then
held vicariously liable for the negligence of the family member. 10
Conversely, if "strict agency" principles were applied, the
owner would not be liable for the family member's negligence
while that member operated the automobile for his or her own
pleasure." Rather, application of "strict agency" principles would
hold the owner liable for the family member's negligence in oper-
ating the vehicle only if the family member was functioning as a
true agent carrying out the direct or actual business of the
owner. 1
2
one hand, some courts went as far as labelling automobiles as "dangerous machines,"
essentially likening them to "dangerous instrumentalities" because of their weight and
ability to travel rapidly. Id. at 328-29. On the other hand, other courts took the opinion
that the number of cars was the real danger, and thus, as the number increased, the dangers
posed by the automobile likewise increased. Id. at 329. As a result of submitting to either
of these propositions, or both, courts began adapting the law to the peculiar circumstances
of the automobile. Id.
8. 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 433(1), at 964 (1969). The Tennessee Supreme Court, in
a leading case on the "family purpose" doctrine, stated the following:
The courts of last resort in many states sustain liability upon the theory that
the member of the family is upon the [owner's] business, and is his agent for the
purpose when driving for pleasure in a car furnished by the father for the
pleasure and entertainment of his family. It is said substantially that the father
has made it his business to entertain the members of his family when he
purchases an automobile for that purpose and delivers it to them for such use.
King v. Smythe, 204 S.W. 296, 297 (Tenn. 1918).
9. See Lattin, supra note 7, at 846 n.2. The terms "master/servant" and
"principal/agent" have been utilized synonymously by courts in the "family purpose"
doctrine context. Id. However, the master and servant terminology probably better
denotes the situation than principal and agent. Id. In general, a principal is held
responsible for his agent's actions if he has authorized or subsequently ratified them. 3
C.J.S. Agency § 390, at 217-18 (1973). A master is liable for his servant's actions when those
actions are committed in the servant's course of employment. 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant
§ 555, at 267 (1948).
10. 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 4:6, at 554 (1983).
As one court noted, the doctrine is indeed "a novel application ... of the principles of
agency...." Hackley v. Robey, 195 S.W. 689,693 (Va. 1938). Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Iowa commented that "the family purpose doctrine [is] a sort of 'kissin cousin' to the
doctrine of agency." McMartin v. Saemisch, 116 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Iowa 1962). In general,
the doctrine is often referred to as an anomaly in the law. Robert L. Saunders, Note,
Extension of the Family Purpose Doctrine to Motorcycles and Private Property, 14 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 699, 702-03 (1978). This anomaly results from applying principles of
agency to a nonagency situation. Id. at 703 n.29.
11. See Lattin, supra note 7, at 851.
12. 7A AM. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 658 (1980). The "family
purpose" doctrine is inappropriately referred to when a true agency relationship exists. Id.
For example, if the family member is driving the vehicle to further the owner's business by
chauffeuring the owner around, then an agency relationship exists and reliance upon
"family purpose" doctrine is unnecessary. Id.
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The creation of this fictional agency relationship under the
"family purpose" doctrine was dictated by public policy. 13 The
doctrine developed to provide parties injured by the negligent
operation of an automobile by the owner's child or spouse with a
financially responsible person from whom to recover.' 4 In the
usual case, the child or spouse was financially irresponsible or, in
other words, judgment proof, and the injured party was unable to
recover.1 5 As a result, some states adopted the "family purpose"
doctrine to protect the public from these financially irresponsible
and negligent drivers.1
6
In 1919, the North Dakota Supreme Court judicially adopted
the "family purpose" doctrine in Ulman v. Lindeman. 7 The court
13. 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 433(1), at 962 (1969).
14. Staroba v. Heitkamp, 338 N.W.2d 640, 641-42 (N.D. 1983). Prior to the
introduction of the automobile into the American society, the laws concerning
principal/agent and master/servant tort liability were generally settled. Fridman, supra
note 7, at 323. The introduction of the automobile, with its destructive capabilities, created
an enormous amount of litigation. Barber, supra note 6, at 1195. See generally William W.
Wilkins, Jr., Note, The Family Purpose Doctrine, 18 S.C. L. REV. 638 (1966) (discussing the
"family purpose" doctrine). In a leading case on the "family purpose" doctrine, the court
noted that the weight of automobiles, coupled with the high rate of speed which they can
attain, creates special dangers in populated areas. King v. Smythe, 204 S.W. 296, 298 (Tenn.
1918). In the process of all this added litigation arising from the automobile, modifications
in the general standards of liability were adopted by various jurisdictions to accommodate
the unique problems posed by the automobile. Barber, supra note 6, at 1195-96.
Generally, under the common law, the owner of an automobile is not held liable for
negligent operation of the vehicle by a person to whom the owner loans the vehicle, unless
that person is an actual agent or employee of the owner. 7A AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and
Highway Traffic § 665, at 898 (1980).
One particular modification of the standards which became the subject of much
controversy was the "family purpose" doctrine. Barber, supra note 6, at 1195.
15. See 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 433(1), at 963 (1969).
16. See id. § 433(1), at 962-63. However, other states have expressly rejected the
doctrine. 7A AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 658, at 893 (1980) (naming
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Texas, Utah). Some
states, such as Minnesota and Iowa, have adopted owner consent statutes, which have
rendered the doctrine obsolete. Id. § 665, at 898. The owner consent statutes are broader
than the "family purpose" doctrine because liability is imposed on the owner for the
negligence of anyone the owner consents to using his or her vehicle, not just members of
the family. Id. North Dakota has also attempted to protect the public from financially
irresponsible minors by statutorily requiring the signature of a parent, guardian, or other
responsible adult on the minor's application for a driver's permit or license. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-06-08 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-09 (1987).
17. 176 N.W. 25 (N.D. 1919). The court did not use the "family purpose" doctrine
terminology, but its language indicated that it was applying the doctrine. See Ulman v.
Lindeman, 176 N.W. 25, 26 (N.D. 1919). In Ulman, the wife of the defendant/owner of the
car allowed a friend to drive the family vehicle while the wife and children of the
defendant were passengers. Id. at 25. The friend was involved in an accident with a third
party, who then sued the defendant/owner. Id. In holding the defendant/owner liable, the
Ulman court stated, "If, at the time of the accident, the wife of the defendant were driving
the car for the purposes of the owner's business (and the pleasure of the family is a business
of the master), the husband would have been liable for its negligent operation." Id. at 26.
The court thus held that the plaintiff/third party had stated a cause of action and reversed
the trial court's demurrer. Id. at 27.
The basis for the language in Ulman came from a 1918 North Dakota case, Vannett v.
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has recognized the doctrine as a fictional agency and a humanita-
rian doctrine designed for the protection of the public.' 8 Gener-
ally, for the "family purpose" doctrine to apply in North Dakota,
the following elements must be present:
(1) an automobile is maintained or furnished 19 for the
pleasure of the family by the head of the family; 0
(2) the driver is a "family member"; '
(3) the driver has general authority, either express or
implied, or specific authority to drive the car;22
(4) the automobile is a "family car";23 and
Cole, 170 N.W. 663 (N.D. 1918). In this case, Cole's wife was driving the family car when
she ran over the plaintiff, who was walking through a cross-walk. Id. at 663. Although
liability based on the "family purpose" doctrine was not specifically the issue of the case, the
court did note, in regard to Mr. Cole's position, that there were "sufficient issuable facts for
submission to the jury upon which the defendant E. H. Cole might be charged with liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior." Id. at 664.
As is apparent, Ulman was an immediate extension of the basic rule of the "family
purpose" doctrine in that the owner was held liable for the negligent operation of the
vehicle by a third person who was permitted by the owner's wife to drive while she was a
passenger in the car. See Ulman, 176 N.W. at 25.
18. Michaelsohn v. Smith, 113 N.W.2d 571, 573 (N.D. 1962) (citing Turner v. Hall's
Adm'x, 252 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Ky. 1952)). The Michaelsohn court also cited a leading case on
the doctrine, King v. Smythe, stating, "'We think the practical administration of justice
between the parties is more the duty of the court than the preservation of some esoteric
theory concerning the law of principal and agent."' Michaelsohn, 113 N.W.2d at 573
(quoting King v. Smythe, 204 S.W. 296, 298 (Tenn. 1918)).
In Staroba v. Heitkamp, 338 N.W.2d 640 (N.D. 1983), the court expressed the doctrine
as follows: "the Family Car Doctrine is that the owner of a vehicle is liable for its negligent
operation by one who is using the vehicle with the express or implied consent of the owner
for purposes of the business or pleasure of the owner's family." Id. at 641.
19. See Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 456-58 (N.D. 1979). In North Dakota,
the element of furnishing does not hinge upon legal title being in the head of the family.
Id. at 458. Rather, important considerations of this element include who paid for the car,
who had the right to control it, the intent of the parties who bought and sold the car, to
whom delivery of the car was made, the understanding between the head of the family and
the family member as to who owned the car, and any other evidence that bears on who in
fact was the owner. Id. at 459.
20. See Posey v. Krogh, 259 N.W. 757, 759 (N.D. 1935). The "family purpose" doctrine
was held inapplicable where the automobile was owned by an adult daughter who still
resided in the family home. Id. at 760.
21. See Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 459-60 (N.D. 1979). The element of
family membership does not hinge upon a blood or marital relationship. Id. (citing Bryan v.
Schatz, 39 N.W.2d 435, 437 (N.D. 1949)). Minority status is also not determinative of the
issue; rather, it should be considered with other circumstances in determining family
membership. Id. at 460 (citing Bryan, 39 N.W.2d at 437).
In Bryan, the son had broken relations with the father and moved away from his
parents' home. Bryan v. Schatz, 39 N.W.2d 435, 436 (N.D. 1949). The son later started
contacting his father and would occasionally visit the family farm. Id. On one occasion, the
son returned to the farm for a few weeks to help with harvest. Id. While staying at his
parents' farm, he used his father's automobile and was involved in an accident. Id. at 437.
The court held that the "family purpose" doctrine was inapplicable because the son was no
longer a "family member" within the doctrine's meaning. Id. at 437-38.
22. See Lauritsen v. Lammers, 161 N.W.2d 804, 810-11 (N.D. 1968); Staroba v.
Heitkamp, 338 N.W.2d 640, 641 (N.D. 1983).
23. See Staroba, 338 N.W.2d at 643. Although the father intended to give his truck to
his son or his son's partnership, the fact that he still retained legal title, control, and other
incidents of ownership made the truck a "family car." Id. at 644. For a discussion of the
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(5) the car is being driven for a purpose for which it was
provided.24
Since the underlying purpose of the doctrine is to provide
recovery for parties injured by financially irresponsible drivers,
the doctrine has generally been considered a plaintiff's tool.25 In
Michaelsohn v. Smith,26 however, a defendant attempted to use
the "family purpose" doctrine to bar the plaintiff's recovery.27
In Michaelsohn, the father/owner of a family car sought
recovery for damage to his automobile from a third party driver
who was involved in an accident with the owner's son.28 The issue
presented was whether the "family purpose" doctrine should
apply in the father's action against the other driver so as to impute
the negligence of the son to his father.29  The North Dakota
Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine, noting that the
underlying purpose of the doctrine-furnishing a financially
responsible person to the injured party-is not served when the
doctrine is used to bar the owner's recovery.3 ° One year later, the
extension of the "family purpose" doctrine to cover motorcycles, see Robert L. Saunders,
TOR7S - Extension of the Family Purpose Doctrine to Motorcycles and Private Property,
14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699 (1978).
24. See Carpenter v. Dunnell, 237 N.W. 779, 780 (N.D. 1931).
25. Barber, supra note 6, at 1196.
26. 113 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1962).
27. See Michaelsohn v. Smith, 113 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1962).
28. Id. at 572.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 574. In addition, the court noted the Minnesota and Iowa owner consent
statutes and the similar purposes underlying those pieces of legislation, stating as follows:
The family purpose doctrine and the financial responsibility statutes, such as
those of Iowa and Minnesota have their origin in an identical public policy, that
of giving an injured party, who is free of negligence, a cause of action against a
financially responsible defendant. The doctrine was an extension of previously
established rules of liability in order to "advance the dictates of natural justice."
Its application, therefore, should only be coextensive with its purpose. To
extend the doctrine to deny the right of a non-negligent car owner to recover
from a negligent driver of another car would defeat the public policy the
doctrine is intended to serve.
Id. The Minnesota owner consent statute provides as follows:
170.54. Driver deemed agent of owner
Whenever any motor vehicle shall be operated within this state, by any per-
son other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the
operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed the agent of the owner of
such motor vehicle in the operation thereof.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.54 (West 1986).
In construing the foregoing statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the
statute has no application when the owner seeks recovery from the third party. Christen-
sen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 10 N.W.2d 406, 418-19 (Minn. 1943). Iowa has similarly inter-
preted its owner consent statute. Stuart v. Piligrim, 74 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Iowa 1956). As has
been noted, Minnesota continues to follow this interpretation of its statute. See 12 DuN-
NELL MINN. DIGEST 2D Motor Vehicles § 6.28 (3d ed. 1986). Likewise, Iowa appears to
maintain its interpretation of its owner consent statute. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.493
n.30 (West 1985).
214 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:209
court reaffirmed Michaelsohn in Brower v. Stolz.31 In Brower, the
court reiterated that the "family purpose" doctrine has no applica-
tion when the owner of a family car seeks to recover for damages
proximately caused by a third party driver, even when the family
member driver has been contributorily negligent.12 It is signifi-
cant to note that both of these decisions predated the 1973 adop-
tion of comparative negligence in North Dakota. 3
Prior to 1973, North Dakota employed the common law doc-
trine of contributory negligence.3 4 Under the doctrine of contrib-
utory negligence, a plaintiff who was merely one percent
negligent was precluded from recovering for his injuries and dam-
ages.3 5 As a result of the inequities accompanying the strict doc-
trine of contributory negligence, 6 states developed devices to
overcome these problems.3 7 As became apparent, however, these
31. 121 N.W.2d 624 (N.D. 1963).
32. Brower v. Stolz, 121 N.W.2d 624, 627 (N.D. 1963).
33. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987). Section 9-10-07, which became effective on
July 1, 1973, provides, in relevant part:
Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an action by any person or
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or
in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed must be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987) (emphasis added). North Dakota's statute was derived
from Minnesota's comparative negligence statute, which, in turn, was developed from Wis-
consin's. Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 118 (N.D. 1979).
Section 9-10-07 has been suspended by a sunset law that was adopted by the North
Dakota Legislature in 1987. See 1987 N.D. LAWS ch. 404, § 15. This law is codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1991). The new section became effective July 8, 1987 and
applies only prospectively. See id. Additionally, § 15 of chapter 404, S.L. 1987, provides
that this law shall be effective from July 8, 1987 through June 30, 1993, and subsequent to
that date it is ineffective. 1987 N.D. LAws, ch. 404, § 15. At the close of this period, § 9-10-
07, as it existed prior to the effective date of § 32-03.2-02, shall become effective July 1,
1993. Id.
34. See, e.g., Michaelsohn v. Smith, 113 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1962); Brower v. Stolz, 121
N.W.2d 624 (N.D. 1963). The origins of the contributory negligence doctrine appear to
have stemmed from the 1809 English case Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng.
Rep. 926 (1809). VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.2, at 3 (2d ed.
1986). In Butterfield, the plaintiff was injured when the horse he was riding ran into a pole
the defendant had left in the roadway. HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1:3, at 6
(2d ed. 1987). The court ruled that the plaintiff could not recover under these
circumstances, because he had failed to exercise ordinary care by running his horse too fast.
Id. § 1:3, at 6-7. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not recover where he
had contributed to the happening of the accident. SCHWARTZ, supra, § 1.2, at 4. The
doctrine expressed in Butterfield was first applied in the United States in the Massachusetts
case of Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. 621 (1824). WOODS, supra, § 1:3, at 7. In the early part of
the twentieth century, however, the doctrine came under sharp criticism because of its
harsh results when a plaintiff was only slightly negligent. Id. § 1:6, at 12. As a result, various
measures were created to limit the harsh outcomes associated with contributory
negligence, such as the doctrine of the last clear chance. Id. § 1:6, at 11. For a discussion of
the last clear chance doctrine, see infra note 37.
35. Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 120 (N.D. 1979).
36. Id.
37. See WOODS, supra note 34, § 1:6, at 11-13. The most important device used to
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devices were only a pretext to solving the real villain, the rigid
contributory negligence doctrine. Eventually, states began adopt-
ing comparative negligence principles both legislatively and judi-
cially;38 thus, liability began to be apportioned proportionately
according to the percentage of fault attributable to each party who
contributed to the injury or damage. 9
North Dakota joined the "march"4 of states adopting com-
parative negligence in 1973 by adopting a "modified" form of
comparative negligence.41 Under North Dakota's comparative
limit the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence was the concept of "last clear chance."
Id. § 1:7, at 13. Under this concept, the rigid contributory negligence bar on a plaintiff's
recovery was held inapplicable if the defendant was determined to have had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident. Id. Other courts avoided the strict contributory negligence
doctrine by declining to employ the doctrine if the defendant's actions were "intentional"
or "reckless." SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, § 1.2(A), at 5.
38. Mark R. Hanson, Comment, The Unit Rule and North Dakota's Comparative
Negligence Statute, 64 N.D. L. REV. 135, 137-38 (1988).
39. Id.
40. Ernest A. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 189
(1950). This early article covering the principles of comparative negligence was published
when only five American states applied the principles generally in negligence actions.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, § 1.1, at 1.
41. WOODS, supra note 34, § 4:3, at 92. In the United States, four primary forms of
comparative negligence laws currently exist. See id. § 4:1, at 85-87. "Pure" comparative
negligence has been adopted both legislatively and judicially by various jurisdictions. See
id. § 4:2, at 87-90. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2501-2509 (Supp. 1990) (Arizona's
legislative adoption of "pure" comparative negligence); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d
1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975) (in which the California Supreme Court judicially adopted the
"pure" form). Under "pure" comparative negligence, a plaintiff can recover regardless of
his percentage of fault unless, of course, he is 100% at fault. WOODS, supra note 34, § 4:1,
at 85. For example, if a plaintiff who has incurred $10,000 worth of damages is 99%
negligent, he may still be allowed to recover $100 from the 1% negligent defendant. Id.
§ 4:1, at 85-86.
Another type of comparative negligence is "modified," of which there are two forms.
Id. § 4:3-4, at 90-93. One form, which North Dakota has employed in its comparative
negligence statute, is known as the "not as great as" or "less degree" "modified"
comparative negligence form. Id. § 4:3, at 90-92. Pursuant to this form, a plaintiff must be
less negligent than the person from whom the plaintiff seeks recovery. Id. § 4:3, at 91. For
the text of North Dakota's comparative negligence statute, see infra, note 42. The second
form of "modified" comparative negligence allows a plaintiff to recover when his or her
negligence equals that of the defendant. Id. § 4:4, at 92. This second form of "modified."
comparative negligence is usually referred to as the "not greater than" form. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 34, § 3.5(B), at 70. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (Supp. 1990) (an
example of the "not greater than" form). The final form of comparative negligence existing
in the United States is called the "slight-gross" system. WOODS, supra note 34, § 4:5, at 93.
Nebraska has such a form. Id. The "slight-gross" form of comparative negligence provides
that the plaintiff can recover only if his or her negligence was slight in comparison to gross
negligence. Id. Once this preliminary determination is made, the plaintiff is allowed to
recover; however, the plaintiff's recovery is decreased by the plaintiff's percentage of
negligence. Id. § 4:5, at 93-94. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1989) (an example of
the "slight-gross" form). The Nebraska statute provides as follows:
Actions for injuries to person or property; contributory negligence; comparative
negligence. In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or
to his property caused by the negligence or act or omission giving rise to strict
liability in tort of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence or act or omission giving
rise to strict liability in tort of the defendant was gross in comparison, but the
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negligence statute, a plaintiff may recover from a defendant if the
plaintiff's negligence is "not as great as" the negligence of the
defendant.42 Thus, the defense of contributory negligence has not
been completely abrogated; rather, the bar on recovery has been
shifted from the point of not allowing any negligence on the plain-
tiff's part to the point of allowing recovery when the plaintiff's
negligence is less than the defendant's or the combined negli-
gence of multiple defendants.43
Subsequent to the firm establishment of comparative negli-
gence in the American jurisprudence system, various courts have
had the opportunity to address the issue of whether the negli-
gence of a family member driver should be imputed to the family
vehicle owner in the owner's action against the third party for
damage to the vehicle. One such jurisdiction that has answered
this question consistently from 1955 up to as recent as 1990 is
Nebraska.44 In Bartek v. Glasers Provisions Co., 4  the Nebraska
contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury in the
mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence
attributable to the plaintiff; and all questions of negligence or act or omission
giving rise to strict liability in tort and contributory negligence shall be for the
jury.
Id.
42. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1991). Section 32-03.2-02 provides, in
relevant part:
Modified comparative fault. Contributory fault does not bar recovery in an
action by any person to recover damages for death or injury to person or
property unless the fault was as great as the combined fault of all persons who
contribute to the injury, but any damages allowed must be diminished in
proportion to the amount of contributing fault attributable to the person
recovering.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). Section 32-03.2-02 is a sun-
set law which replaced § 9-10-07 and will be effective only until June 30, 1993, at which
time § 9-10-07 will be reinstated unless the North Dakota legislature takes additional action
in the meantime. Hanson, supra note 38, at 136 n.6. The language of § 9-10-07 only pro-
vides for a case involving a single defendant. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07. For the text
of § 9-10-07, see supra note 33.
Thus, by adopting § 32-03.2-02, the North Dakota Legislature instilled two primary
changes in the comparative fault law. See Hanson, supra note 38, at 135 n.3. First of all,
§ 32-03.2-02 repealed joint and several liability and adopted several liability for multiple
tortfeasors. Id. Secondly, the new section adopted the unit rule, whereby the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff is compared against the combined fault of all parties contributing
to the injury. Id. For example, under the unit rule if the plaintiff is determined to be
33.33% negligent, and there are two defendants who are each 33.33%, the plaintiff will not
be precluded from recovery because his or her percentage of negligence is not as great as
the combined negligence of the defendants. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02, supra. For
a thorough discussion of North Dakota's comparative negligence statute and the unit rule,
see Hanson, supra note 38.
43. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1991). For the text of the statute, see
supra note 42.
44. See Bartek v. Glasers Provisions Co., 71 N.W.2d 466 (Neb. 1955); Paprocki v.
Stopak, 330 N.W.2d 475 (Neb. 1983); Looney v. Pickering, 439 N.W.2d 467 (Neb. 1989);
Russell v. Luevano, 452 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 1990).
45. 71 N.W.2d 466 (Neb. 1955).
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Supreme Court held that the contributory negligence of the hus-
band/driver could not be imputed to the wife/passenger/owner in
her action for personal injuries and property damage against the
other driver.46
Likewise, in Paprocki v. Stopak,47 Looney v. Pickering,48 and
Russell v. Luevano,49 the Nebraska court reaffirmed its earlier rul-
ing not to impute.50 In Looney, the court noted that the objective
of the "family purpose" doctrine and the owner consent statutes
must first be determined in order to decide the issue.5 If the
objective of the doctrine or statute is to hold the owner responsi-
ble in all respects, then the negligence of the driver may be
imputed to the owner.5 2 If, however, the theory underlying the
doctrine or statute is merely to provide for greater opportunity of
recovery for the third party injured by the negligent operation of
an automobile by a financially irresponsible driver, then the doc-
trine or statute should not be construed to impute the negligence
of the driver to the owner.53 The Nebraska Supreme Court then
46. Bartek, 71 N.W.2d at 473. In Bartek, the plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a car
which she owned but which was being operated by her husband. Id. at 470. The car was
involved in an accident, and the plaintiff sued the other vehicle's driver for personal injuries
she sustained and for property damage to her car. Id. at 469-70. The court declined to
impute the negligence of the husband to the wife/owner by way of the "family purpose"
doctrine, stating as follows:
The family purpose doctrine does not have for its objective the purpose of
defeating a claim for damages by a guest by imputing the negligence of a driver
to such guest but rather to impose upon the owner of a car being used for family
purposes the responsibility for its operation as a matter of public policy. It has no
application here.
Id. at 473.-
47. 330 N.W.2d 475 (Neb. 1983). In Paprocki, the court made it clear that the rule
prohibiting imputation of negligence applied to personal injury cases as well as to property
damage suits. Paprocki, 330 N.W.2d at 476-77.
48. 439 N.W.2d 467 (Neb. 1989).
49. 452 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 1990).
50. Paprocki v. Stopak, 330 N.W.2d 475, 477 (Neb. 1983); Looney v. Pickering, 439
N.W.2d 467, 470-71 (Neb. 1989); Russell v. Luevano, 452 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Neb. 1990).
51. Looney, 439 N.W.2d at 470. In Looney, the owners of a family car sued the driver
of another car who was involved in an accident with the owners' son. Id. at 469. Again, the
court declined to impute the negligence of the son to the owner, by recognizing the
objective of the "family purpose" doctrine and stating as follows:
It is therefore apparent that the rule developed in this state had for its purpose
not the making of the owner "responsible in all respects." but, rather, the
providing of financial responsibility to third persons injured through the
negligence of financially irresponsible automobile drivers. As stated in
Christensen v. Hennepin Transportation Co. Inc., 215 Minn. 394, 413, 10 N.W.2d
406, 417 (1943), 'The very reason for holding the consenting owner liable for
negligence of the operator of his automobile, that of furnishing financial
responsibility to an injured party, is completely absent in the owner's action to
recover for damages' done to his car by a negligent third party.
Id. at 470.
52. Id. at 470 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 485 cmt. d (1965)).
53. Id.
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stated that the theory supporting the development of the "family
purpose" doctrine fell squarely within the latter reasoning and
held the doctrine inapplicable in the context of an owner seeking
recovery from a third party for property damage to the owner's
vehicle.54
As noted above, Minnesota and Iowa have similarly inter-
preted their owner consent statutes to prohibit the imputation of
the driver's negligence to the owner when the owner seeks recov-
ery from the other driver.55 Connecticut has also statutorily pro-
vided that the "family purpose" doctrine will not be applied to
impute the negligence of a family car driver to the owner. 56 Also,
the highest court in West Virginia decided in 1982 against the
imputation of negligence in this context, noting that the use of the
"family purpose" doctrine by a defendant to shield himself from
liability was inconsistent with the purpose behind the doctrine.
57
On the other hand, states such as Tennessee and North Caro-
lina have taken positions pointedly in opposition to Nebraska and
the other above noted states. For example, North Carolina, which
has yet to adopt comparative negligence, treats the family car
driver as if he actually is an agent/servant of the owner in all
respects, and therefore, pursuant to agency law, North Carolina
courts impute the negligence to the owner.58 Although the Ten-
54. Id.
55. Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 10 N.W.2d 406, 418-19 (Minn. 1943); Stuart
v. Pilgrim, 74 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 1956). See supra note 30.
56. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(m) (West 1991). Section 52-572h(m)
provides: "The family car doctrine shall not be applied to impute contributory. or
comparative negligence pursuant to this section to the owner of any motor vehicle or motor
boat." Id.
57. Bartz v. Wheat, 285 S.E.2d 894, 896 (W. Va. 1982). After noting that the case was
one of first impression, the court concluded that the "better-reasoned approach" to the
problem was to prohibit extending the "family purpose" doctrine and limit it to its
"traditional use as a plaintiff's rule." Bartz, 285 S.E.2d at 895-96. While the court noted
that agency principles had been used in the past to describe the workings of the "family
purpose" doctrine, the court distinguished the doctrine from agency, stating as follows:
Under the law of agency, the contributory negligence of an agent would bar
recovery by the principal. We note that the purpose of agency law is to make
the person who benefits from the agent's actions accountable for his mistakes.
There is no such rationale behind the family purpose doctrine. Liability is
imputed to the vehicle's owner only as a means of bettering the chances of
financial recovery for the plaintiff. While the agency analogy may be helpful in
some instances for understanding the family purpose doctrine, we should not
feel constrained by agency labels, attached largely for pedagogical reasons, to
give the doctrine characteristics which are not necessary to its peculiar role in
our law.
Id. at 896 (citation omitted). While Bartz does not specifically state that the imputation is
curtailed in personal injury cases as well as property damage cases, the opinion does cite
Nevada authority which so holds. Id. Additionally, a subsequent West Virginia case
appears to support the proposition that the prohibition of imputation applies also to per-
sonal injury cases. See Erie Indem. Co. v. Kerns, 367 S.E.2d 774, 776 (W. Va. 1988).
58. See Russell v. Hamlett, 135 S.E.2d 547 (N.C. 1964). The parties stipulated that the
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nessee Court of Appeals recognized the weakness of applying a
both ways rule in this context, the court opted to preserve uni-
formity in the law and imputed the negligence of the family driver
to the owner.59
driver was a driver of a family purpose automobile. Id. at 548. Therefore, the North
Carolina Supreme Court, without discussion, found the driver to be a driver of a family
purpose automobile and simply declared the driver to be the agent of the owner; therefore,
the court held that the agent's contributory negligence would be imputed to the owner. Id.
at 548-49.
59. Stephens v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 38, 42-43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). In this case, the
plaintiff/mother sued the driver of another vehicle for personal injuries and property
damage sustained when the mother was riding in her own car being driven by her
daughter. Id. at 40. The question presented was whether the trial judge should have
instructed the jury on principles that would allow them to impute the contributory
negligence of the daughter to the mother. Id. In deciding that the trial judge had erred,
the court expounded on the issue as follows:
It is, of course, another matter to impute the contributory negligence of the
servant to the master as advocated by the Restatement. This exercise in logic
has been labeled "the bath ways test." The test results in the innocent plaintiff's
action against a negligent defendant being barred by the negligence of the
plaintiff's servant because the plaintiff would have been responsible for the harm
caused by the servant if the plaintiff had been a defendant in the case.
We are not unmindful that the both ways test has been criticized because it
runs counter to the reason why the rule of vicarious liability was adopted in the
first place. In Section 23.6 of Harper & James, the Law of Torts, the authors
point out:
[T]he seriousness and growth of the automobile problem and the plight of
uncompensated accident victims led to increasing pressure for providing for
financially responsible defendants. One response to this pressure was the
extension of vicarious liability by the court made "family purpose" doctrine...
This represented a departure from the fault principle so as to impose liability on
innocent parties for reasons similar to those leading to workmen's compensation
- the owners were better distributors of the risks which their lawful activities
created than were their victims.
Under these. . . rules expanding vicarious liability beyond the scope of the
older law, the question soon arose whether negligence should be imputed to a
plaintiff on the same new wider basis. Should the bailee's negligence be
imputed to his bailor, or the son's to the father, when the bailor or father sues a
negligent third person for damage to the automobile? The formal logic to the
both ways test would give an affirmative answer, and some courts . . .have
imputed the negligence on this basis. But this leads to the paradox that a rule
which departed from the common law in response to an urge towards wider
liability is being used to curtail liability by expanding the scope of a defense to it.
Courts that have perceived this difficulty have reevaluated the both ways test.
Some of them have found that it lacks validity in this context wherein it would
serve as a vehicle of reaction rather than reform. As the Minnesota court has
said, "The very reason for holding the consenting owner liable for negligence of
the operator of his automobile, that of furnishing financial responsibility to an
injured party, is completely absent in the owner's action to recover for damages"
done to his car by a negligent third party.We realize that by adopting the Restatement position we are adding to an
innocent party another burden in addition to the liability imposed by the family
purpose doctrine. However, if all we are seeking in this area of the law is a
financial reservoir then we should say so directly and impose liability in each
case on the party more able to pay it.
On the other hand, so long as we have a rule in our law of agency that the
master is liable for the negligence of his servant and a rule in the law of torts that
the owner of an automobile is liable for the negligence of the family member
driving the automobile for a family purpose, the rules should be applied
uniformly.
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In Schobinger v. Ivey,6" the North Dakota Supreme Court
once again confronted the issue of whether or not the "family pur-
pose" doctrine should apply to impute the negligence of the fam-
ily member driver to the owner in the owner's suit against the
third party driver.61 The court immediately pointed out that this
question had been addressed previously in Michaelsohn v. Smith62
and Brower v. Stolz, 63 in which the court declined to apply the
"family purpose" doctrine in such a fashion.64 The court went on
to note, however, that these earlier decisions had been made prior
to the adoption of comparative negligence in North Dakota.65
Id. at 42 (citations omitted) (quoting HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW oF TORTS § 23.6). The
Stephens opinion gives no specific indication of whether the rule to impute applies in per-
sonal injury and property damage cases; however, the broad language used by the court
may indicate the rule to impute applies equally in both situations. See id. at 42-43 ("[T]he
negligence of the daughter would bar any recovery by the mother against the driver of the
other automobile.").
60. 467 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1991).
61. Schobinger v. Ivey, 467 N.W.2d 728, 729 (N.D. 1991).
62. 113 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1962). For a discussion of Michaelsohn, see supra notes 26-
31 and accompanying text.
63. 121 N.W.2d 624 (N.D. 1963). For a discussion of Brower, see supra notes 32-33 and
accompanying text.
64. Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 729.
65. Id. One case that neither the parties nor the court referred to in the determination
of the case was Broderson v. Boehm, 253 N.W.2d 864 (N.D. 1977). See Schobinger v. Ivey,
467 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1991). Broderson is a 1977 North Dakota Supreme Court case
involving an accident that took place on October 26, 1973. Broderson, 253 N.W.2d at 865.
Section 9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides for comparative
negligence in North Dakota, became effective on July 1, 1973; therefore, the decision of
Broderson occurred after the adoption of comparative negligence in North Dakota. See
Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 122 (N.D. 1979).
In Broderson, Pauline Boehm was involved in an accident with another vehicle driven
by Ronald Wold. Broderson, 253 N.W.2d at 865. Accompanying Mrs. Boehm at the time of
the accident were her three daughters, Debra, 12, Kara, 7, and Kami, 6. Id. As a result of
the accident, Mrs. Boehm and her daughter Debra died from the injuries they sustained.
Id. An administrator for Debra's estate sued Ronald Wold, Milton Wold (Ronald's father),
Donald Boehm (Debra's father who owned the car driven by Pauline), and McKenzie
County for the wrongful death of Debra. Id. at 866. The court noted that Donald Boehm
was only named as a defendant pursuant to the "family purpose" doctrine because he
owned the vehicle in which Debra was a passenger. Id. at 868. Thus, the issue in the case
encompassed whether Donald Boehm, as the heir of Debra, could benefit or recover in a
case in which he was a named defendant. Id. at 866. While not an issue on the appeal, the
North Dakota Supreme Court summarily noted its approval of the trial court's
memorandum opinion of January 27, 1976 stating that "imputed negligence under the
"family purpose" doctrine was not a bar to Donald Boehm's right of recovery .. ." Id. at
868. The trial court opinion of January 27, 1976, in which the court expressed its approval
of the section on imputed negligence under the "family purpose" doctrine, specifically cites
Michaelsohn and Brower for the proposition that the negligence of the family driver should
not be imputed to the owner of the car in the owner's suit against a third party. Broderson
v. Boehm, Civil No. 3639, 34, 40-41 (5th Dist. Ct. of N.D. Jan. 27, 1976) (located in North
Dakota Brief Reports 253 N.W.2d (2)).
Thus, while the facts of Broderson may be distinguishable from Schobinger due to the
damages sought to be recovered in each case, a discussion or mention of Broderson is
conspicuously absent from the determination in Schobinger. This is especially significant,
since the Broderson case discusses the imputation of negligence under the "family purpose"
doctrine after North Dakota had adopted comparative negligence. See Broderson, 253
N.W.2d at 868.
1992] CASE COMMENT
The embracement of comparative negligence in North
Dakota caused the court to re-examine the issue.66 The court rea-
soned that a review was necessary since the harsh result that
would occur under the supplanted contributory negligence law-
where a plaintiff would be barred from recovery even if the auto-
mobile driver was slightly negligent-no longer existed.6 7
Although the court noted that the weight of authority went
against imputing the family member's negligence in these circum-
stances, the court stated that "fairness requires that an authorized
driver's negligence should be considered in determining the
extent of the family vehicle owner's recovery against third parties
for damages to the family vehicle. 68 Consequently, the court
decided to apply a "both ways" test and concluded that the "fam-
ily purpose" doctrine should be extended to impute the negli-
gence of a family vehicle driver to the family vehicle owner when
the owner seeks recovery for property damages from the third
party driver. 9
66. Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 730. The court apparently inadvertently cited the
wrong comparative negligence statute in the Schobinger opinion. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03.2-02, supra note 42. The court cited § 9-10-07, the old comparative negligence
statute, which has been replaced by the § 32-03.2-02 sunset statute, effective from July 8,
1987 through June 30, 1993. Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 730. Therefore, since the accident
involved in Schobinger occurred on October 31, 1988, the appropriate section to apply is
§ 32-03.2-02. Cf. Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 729.
67. Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 730.
68. Id.
69. Id. Consequently, the court expressly overruled Michaelsohn and Brower "to the
extent that they are inconsistent" with the Schobinger opinion. Id. The legal concept
referred to as the "both ways" test in the realms of vicarious liability was so named by the
late Dean Prosser. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, § 16.1, at 252. According to the "both ways"
test, if A would be held vicariously liable for the actions of B, then B's contributory
negligence will be imputed to A to limit or prevent A's recovery. Id. Thus, if B and C are
involved in an automobile accident and A (the owner of the car driven by B) brought suit
against C for damage to A's car, the contributory negligence of B would be imputed to A.
See Schobinger v. Ivey, 467 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1991).
However, as Schwartz has commented:
It should be noted that in general tort law there has been considerable
dissatisfaction with the "both ways" test. This is because the reasons underlying
vicarious liability do not always support the imputation of contributory
negligence. For example, in Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Incorporated the
Supreme Court of Minnesota declined to impute a servant's contributory
negligence to bar his master's claim for damage to an automobile. The court
indicated that a basic reason for vicarious liability of a master is to reach a
financially responsible party, and that this does not justify imputing the servant's
negligence to bar a master's claim against a third person. The abandonment of
the "both ways" test has proceeded apace in Minnesota and has had some minor
impact in other states.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, § 16.1, at 254-55 (footnotes omitted). While in Schobinger the
North Dakota Supreme Court essentially decided to apply a "both ways" test because of the
adoption of comparative negligence in North Dakota, Schwartz had previously stated that:
It should be noted that neither in Minnesota nor in other states has compara-
tive negligence been cited as a reason for or against abandoning the "both ways"
rule. The Minnesota decision (Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.) occurred
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Prior to the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in
Schobinger, case law in North Dakota supported the proposition
that the "family purpose" doctrine could not be employed by a
defendant to shield himself from a plaintiff/owner of the family
vehicle seeking recovery for damage to his automobile.70 As a
result of the decision in Schobinger, the "family purpose" doctrine
was extended to allow the negligence of a family driver to be
imputed to the owner in the owner's action for property dam-
ages.7 Thus, a family car owner who is an innocent party is sad-
dled with a burden that is in addition to the traditional liability
imposed by the workings of the "family purpose" doctrine.72 The
stark implication of combining this new extension of the "family
purpose" doctrine with North Dakota's comparative negligence
statute yields the outcome that the owner of a family car will be
precluded from any recovery for property damage caused by a
negligent third party when the percentage of negligence attribu-
table to the driver of the family car is equal to or greater than the
negligence of the third party.73
A question that remains after Schobinger is whether the "fam-
ily purpose" doctrine would apply in the personal injury context
when the owner of the family car is injured as a passenger. Under
such circumstances, a court could hold that the driver's negligence
be imputed to the owner in the owner's action for property dam-
ages but not in the owner's action for personal injuries.7 a Relying
before that state adopted comparative negligence. Furthermore, a number of
comparative negligence states have continued to apply the "both ways" test.
Thus, today, reconsideration and change in the imputing of contributory negli-
gence has taken place independently of comparative negligence. Nevertheless, a
state might find the inception of comparative negligence a stimulus for examin-
ing the continued viability of the "both ways" test and whether contributory
negligence should continue to be imputed. Comparative negligence is predi-
cated on the general idea that damages should be allocated on the basis of fault;
the "both ways" test does not serve that purpose.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, § 16.1, at 255 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Conse-
quently, as is apparent, the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Schobinger to
employ a "both ways" test completely contradicts Schwartz's line of reasoning. Compare
Schobinger v. Ivey, 467 N.W.2d 728, 730 (N.D. 1991) with SCHWARTZ, supra note 34,
§ 16.1, at 255 (where Schwartz notes that the adoption of comparative negligence may lead
a state to re-examine the "continued viability" of the "both ways" test).
70. Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 729.
71. Id. at 730.
72. See Stephens v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
73. See Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 730; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1991). If
the percentage of negligence attributable to the family car driver is less than the third
party's share of the negligence, the owner may recover property damages from the third
party according to the third party's percentage of fault. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02
(Supp. 1991).
74. See Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 730. The Schobinger opinion states that "the family
purpose doctrine should be extended to impute the driver's negligence to the owner of the
family vehicle for purpose of limiting the owner's recovery for property damage against a
222 [Vol. 68:209
19921 CASE COMMENT 223
solely on Schobinger, however, it is uncertain whether a personal
injury situation would be accorded different treatment in North
Dakota. 5
In essence, the "family purpose" doctrine (which creates a fic-
tional agency) was created for public policy considerations to
apply to situations that generally would constitute a bailment-like
context.76 The liability created by the doctrine served to provide
financial responsibility for injured third parties.77 The extension of
the doctrine in North Dakota resulting from Schobinger clearly
does not facilitate the function for which the doctrine was created.
The law is not a static creature, but when changes are adopted
third party tortfeasor." Id. (emphasis added). In addition Schobinger's factual limitation to
property damage claims, various precedents in both North Dakota and Minnesota point to
prohibiting imputation in suits by the owner for personal injuries. See Broderson v. Boehm,
253 N.W.2d 864 (N.D. 1977); Jasper v. Freitag, 145 N.W.2d 879, 885-86 (N.D. 1966); Weber
v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 540, 544-45 (Minn. 1966); Weckerly v. Abear, 256
N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1977). For a discussion of Broderson, see supra note 65.
In Jasper, the wife/owner of the vehicle sued the third party for personal injuries she
sustained when her husband was driving the car. Jasper, 145 N.W.2d at 881. The court
reversed the lower court's ruling in favor of the defendant, premising the reversal on an
erroneous instruction which provided that "there is a presumption, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, that an owner present in his or her car has the power to control
it." Id. at 886. In so holding, the court specifically cited with approval the Minnesota case
of Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. Id. at 885-86.
Weber involved a master-servant relationship in which the master incurred personal
injuries while he was a passenger in his truck driven by his servant. Weber, 144 N.W.2d at
541. Dispensing with the old rule of imputing the servant's negligence to the master to bar
the master's action, the Minnesota court criticized the "both ways" test and noted that the
reasoning supporting its owner consent statutes did not require imputation in these
circumstances. Id. at 542-45. The Weber court specifically limited its holding to automobile
negligence cases. Id. at 545.
The scope of the Weber decision initially was unclear on the issue of whether the
holding applied in personal injury suits as well as suits seeking recovery for property
damage. See id. Eventually, in 1977, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Weckerly v. Abear and held that the negligence of the servant would be imputed to the
master in the master's suit against the third party for property damage. Weckerly, 256
N.W.2d at 82. Thus, according to Minnesota law concerning master-servant relationship,
the negligence of a servant will be imputed to the owner when the owner seeks recovery
for property damage; however, the negligence of the servant will not be imputed to the
owner in his action for personal injuries. See id. at 81-82.
Based on the limited holding in Schobinger allowing for imputation only in property
damage cases and the above-noted Minnesota case law in the master-servant realm, it is
conceivable that the North Dakota Supreme Court will adopt this approach with the
"family purpose" doctrine in North Dakota. See Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 728; Weber, 144
N.W.2d at 540; Weckerly, 256 N.W.2d at 80.
However, it should be noted at this point that when the owner is in the car, the "family
purpose" doctrine may be inapplicable if the driver is a true agent carrying out the direct
business of the owner. See 7A AM. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 658 (1980).
For a discussion of passenger/owner's rights and liabilities to a third party, see Janet B.
Jones, Annotation, Fact that Passenger in Negligently Operated Motor Vehicle is Owner as
Affecting Passenger's Liability to or Rights Against Third Person-Modern Cases, 37
A.L.R.4th 565 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
75. See Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 730.
76. Michaelsohn v. Smith, 113 N.W.2d 571, 573 (N.D. 1962). A bailment situation
would exist when the bailee is not an agent of the bailor and the bailee has permission to use
the bailor's car. See Lattin, supra note 7, at 850 n.10.77. See Lattin, supra note 7, at 850 n.10.
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they must be grounded in sound policy."8 The family purpose doc-
trine was developed to accommodate public policy in a bailment-
type situation, but the Schobinger court's unwarranted extension
of the doctrine gives a third party who is involved in an accident
with a "family purpose" driver a windfall he would not receive
had he been involved in an accident with a mere bailee. 9
As a result of tort reform, states have sought to ground liability
according to one's fault. The Schobinger decision moves North
Dakota away from this goal, while at the same time providing no
overriding social policy.8 0 This is not to say there is no logical rea-
soning to support the Schobinger court's deviation from prior case
law; however, there does not appear to be an overriding policy
that dictates the deviation from the 'norm' of general bailment
principles. Perhaps the court considered the practical effects of
insurance in its effort to balance the scales of "fairness." 81
Andrew L. B. Noah
78. Weckerly v. Abear, 256 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1977).
79. See 7A AM. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 641 (1980). As has been
stated, "Ownership alone is not sufficient to impose liability upon the owner of an
automobile because of the negligence of another whom he has permitted to use the
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